This study begins with an exploration of the external (European Union) and internal (Czech political parties) forces that shaped the creation of regional assemblies in the Czech
Second Republic (late 1938 (late -March 1939 and the Nazi occupation. After a brief restoration of the pre-war system in 1945, the communist regime that took power in 1948 dissolved the lands in favor of a centralized system of administrative regions that lacked any substance of self-government. Following the Velvet Revolution of 1989, these regions were quickly abolished along with other vestiges of the communist system.
Despite this limited tradition, or perhaps because of it, political decentralization was a popular goal in the early post-communist period. In Czechoslovakia, as in other Central and Eastern European countries, decentralization was widely regarded as an important aspect of democratization and a necessary repudiation of the overly centralized communist state.
2 There was considerable disagreement, however, over the direction that decentralization should take: whether self-governing powers should be located at the regional or the local level, and if the former, what design the new regions should follow. Decentralization also had its opponents, including those who favored a more centralist approach to government and feared the disintegrative forces that could be unleashed by political devolution. Such fears were reinforced by Slovak demands for autonomy and the resultant "Velvet Divorce" of 1992-1993.
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND REGIONAL GOVERNANCE
While there were strong indigenous pressures for decentralization, an important role in this process was also played by the prospect of European Union membership and EU entry requirements. Before candidate countries can join the EU, they must adopt and implement the full body of EU rules and legislation (the so-called acquis communautaire), including the institutional and administrative requirements of EU regional policy. 3 One such requirement is a regionalized system of administration, with the existence of competent regional bodies that can serve as partners of the Commission-the EU's central administrative body-and national governments in the management of EU Structural Funds programs. 4 Although it requires regionalized administrative structures, the EU does not clearly define these, nor has the EU sought to impose a uniform model or template for regional governance on its member states. Instead, the EU takes the position that this is an internal matter in which it has no legal competence. National governments have thus been given wide latitude in the design of regional administrative systems, and they have also been allowed to designate the appropriate regional authorities for partnership in accordance with national conditions, traditions, and constitutional frameworks. This approach has generally been followed in the EU's preaccession advice to the candidate states as well. The Commission merely requires that "appropriate" systems of regional administration and governance be in place by the time of accession, without trying to define these in any concrete way. However, in its regular progress reports on the preparation of individual candidate countries for accession and through other means, the Commission also has made clear its preference for democratically elected regional governments that possess a substantial amount of financial and legal autonomy.
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In the early 1990s, EU membership remained but a distant goal. The government of Czechoslovakia signed an association agreement ("Europe Agreement") with the EU in 1991, 6 but the Czech Republic did not formally apply for membership until 1996. Formal accession negotiations did not begin until 1998, and took four years to complete. Nonetheless, EU accession (along with NATO membership) was from the beginning a top-priority objective of the Czech government and a key element of its strategy to "rejoin Europe." Thus, awareness of EU membership requirements clearly influenced Czech politicians and government officials as they designed their new governmental system in the early post-communist period. As will be seen below, a key Commission report in 1997 played an important role in spurring agreement on regional reform, while the accession negotiations and regular Commission "progress reports" beginning in 1998 exerted pressure on the Czech government to fully implement regional reform measures.
The process of regionalization in the Czech Republic can thus be analyzed through the theoretical lens of "Europeanization," an approach which examines the impact on domestic (national) policies and political systems of EU policies and processes.
7 This theoretical perspective is usually applied to current member states, but has been increasingly extended to candidate countries in the pre-accession period as well. of the literature on Europeanization stresses the role of domestic politics and national conditions in interaction with EU pressures and forces, with the result that diversity rather than convergence is often the outcome of exposure to common EU rules and processes. A similar conclusion is reached in much of the literature that focuses more narrowly on EU regional policy and regionalization. As many of these studies have shown, the impact of EU regional policy on the domestic politics and governance of the member states has varied considerably, in accordance with such factors as member-state size, governmental traditions, and existing territorial arrangements. 9 The Czech case confirms the important role of domestic politics and conditions in shaping regional reform within the context of EU pressures and requirements. In the following section, the key role of the political parties is examined.
THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND REGIONAL REFORM
Responding to both internal demands and external pressures for decentralization, the 1993 Czech Constitution declares: "The Czech Republic is composed of municipalities which are the basic territorial administrative units and regions which are higher territorial administrative units."
10 The authors of the Constitution reportedly viewed decentralization and the diffusion of power as a major democratic goal, while the existence of regional bodies would also satisfy an important EU condition for accession." Because of disagreement about the nature and extent of decentralization, however, the Constitution was intentionally vague about the form and content of any new regional system. The number and boundaries of the regions, as well as the precise powers or competences of the regional governments, remained to be established.
In the initial debate on regional reform in Czechoslovakia, some early support existed for self-government of the historic lands of Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia. In fact, Moravian parties advocating greater regional independence from Prague enjoyed some initial success in the early 1990s. or culturally based regional autonomy, but also increased fears of further political disintegration. Many Czechs, and most political parties, felt that a dualistic, two-lands, organization of the Czech Republic might produce the same sort of divisions that doomed the ill-fated Czech and Slovak Federation. Such fears were underscored by external developments, especially the political disintegration and war in the former Yugoslavia. As a consequence, support for the pro-autonomy Moravian parties declined sharply by the mid-1990s, evidenced by their poor performance in the 1996 elections for the Chamber of Deputies.
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In the debate on regional reform after 1993, therefore, issues of functionality and political interests and criteria other than historical identity played the leading role. The debate initially focused on the number and boundaries of the new regions, and later the powers or competences of regional governments and how regional representatives would be elected. The concept of political decentralization enjoyed broad support among citizens, who generally favored the idea of moving government closer to the people. The legislative debate, however, was dominated by the major political parties, which often had their own interests in mind more than democratic principles or the requirements of governmental efficiency.
Among the major parties, Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus' Civic Democratic party (ODS) was perhaps the most skeptical about the merits of regionalization.
14 This was mainly because of its centralist preferences and liberal economic ideology. Both the ODS and Klaus felt that centralized administration would be more efficient, and they were concerned that the creation of regional authorities would significantly increase bureaucracy and financial costs. Perhaps even more important, they were concerned that regionalization would undermine the control of the major parties and central government authorities by establishing independent regional bases of political power. The Klaus government (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) was thus in no hurry to create a new regional system, and lack of movement on this question corresponded with high levels of popular support for the government.
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Klaus' government-coalition partners-the Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL) and the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA)-were both more strongly supportive of decentralization, and favored a speedy creation of regional authorities and a second national chamber (Senate) to represent regional interests. They mainly differed on the number of regions, with the Christian Democrats favoring the creation of nine regions and the Civic Democratic Alliance, thirteen. The Christian Democrats had a natural interest in promoting regionalization because the bulk of its electoral support was in ''Moravian parties did not even receive one percent of the vote, thus falling well short of the 5 percent threshold necessary for entering the Chamber of Deputies. For the 1996 election results, see Czech National Office Election Server, "Chamber of Deputies 1996"; http://www.volby.cz/pls/psl996-win/u63. Moravia. According to the Civic Democratic Alliance, decentralization would provide for a more effective administration of public affairs, while enhancing democracy by limiting the power of the state. 16 Among the main opposition parties, the Social Democrats (CSSD) supported regionalization, as they sought to capitalize on growing unemployment in structurally weak regions through an emphasis on EU-style regional development policy, while the Communists were opposed.
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Debate initially focused on the number of regions to be created in fulfillment of the Constitution's mandate. Those favoring a larger number of regions, including opponents of decentralization such as Klaus and the Civic Democratic party, wanted to minimize the political importance of the new regions by inflating their number and reducing their size. Some selfinterested regional and local politicians, wanting to maximize the number of new political positions, also favored creating a larger number. Those advocating a smaller number of larger regions argued that this would be more effective, while also being more aligned with EU regional policy requirements regarding the compatibility of administrative and "cohesion" regions. The average population of EU NUTS 18 II regions-the basic territorial unit eligible for Objective 1 assistance under the Structural Fundswas 2.5 million. In strict accordance with this criterion, only 4-5 selfgoverning regions would be necessary for a country of 10.3 million people.
In June 1994, the Civic Democratic party proposed converting the existing 75 administrative districts into regions. This proposal was strongly rejected by its coalition partners. A subsequent ODS proposal to create 17 regions was rejected by the Parliament in June 1995. The CSSD, which voted against the Civic Democratic party proposal, backed the Christian Democratic idea of creating nine regions. President Havel also sided with the proponents of decentralization, while refraining from providing any detailed position on this issue.
The stalemate on regional reform persisted until after the 1996 parliamentary elections. A key role in finally achieving a breakthrough was played by the EU Commission's June 1997 "Opinion" on the Czech Republic's application for EU membership, which castigated the Czech government for its lack of regional policy and the administrative and legal structures for implementing one. In particular, the Commission criticized the absence of "elected" bodies between the central state and commune (local) levels. 19 Other than this statement, the Commission refrained from The Commission's Opinion invigorated the debate on regional policy, and an agreement on regional reform was finally reached among the government parties and the Social Democrats in October 1997. The resulting "Constitutional Act on the Formation of the Regions" called for dividing the Czech Republic into 14 regions, or kraj, each with its own elected assembly (see Map 1). Only the Communists, the radical right-wing party of Miroslav Sladek, 21 and some Social Democrat deputies voted against the law.
22 The 14 regions, with an average population of 800,000 each, were much smaller than the average EU NUTS II region, and would have to be combined into larger "cohesion regions" for the purposes of EU regional policy. 23 The boundaries of the new regions were also controversial, with According to the new law, each of the regions elects, for a four-year term, a unicameral assembly consisting of 45, 55, or 65 members, depending on the population of the region. The assemblies elect, from among their members, a president (hejtman), who chairs the regional council and represents the region externally, and is responsible to the assembly. The regional council is composed of the president, one or more vice-presidents, and 9 to 11 council members, depending on the size of the region. The council members are each assigned responsibility for one of the region's areas of policy competence (see below), and are assisted in their work by a small secretariat and specialized commissions. The administrative bureaucracy of the region is the regional authority, which implements the decisions of the assembly and council. The regional governments can only act in those areas in which they are legally competent.
The law creating the new regions was supposed to take effect in January 2000. However, delays in approving the necessary legislation on elections and state administration reform meant that the first set of regional elections did not take place until November 2000, and the new regional authorities thus did not begin functioning until January 2001. The Civic Democratic party, while declaring its acceptance of the law, did little to implement it in its remaining months in government. 25 The minority Social Democratic government that took power following elections in April 1998 was more sympathetic to regionalization, but was somewhat constrained by its "opposition treaty" with the Civic Democratic party.
An initial government proposal for an electoral law for regional elections was put forward in August 1999. This excluded independent candidates and mayors from running in regional assembly elections, however, and greatly disadvantaged small parties. 26 It was thus widely viewed by its opponents as an effort by the Social Democrats and the Civic Democratic party to create an electoral system biased in favor of the two large parties, with the goal of creating a two-party system in the Czech Republic. A revised version that was approved in March 2000 responded to the criticism of the Christian Democrats and others by allowing mayors to be candidates in regional elections, although it still discriminated against smaller parties and forced them into alliances to have any chance of success. 27 One outcome Tomas Lebeda, "Volebnf system pro krajske volby. Charakteristika systemu ajeho dfisledky, nedostatky a moXna resent" ["Electoral system for regional elections. Characteristics of the system and its impact, of this law was the consolidation of the Christian Democrats, the Union of Freedom (US), the Civic Democratic Alliance, and the Democratic Union (DEU) into a new electoral alliance known as the "Four-Party Coalition." Four-party agreements were signed in all regions, establishing common electoral programs and lists of candidates. Entering the regional elections, the Four-Party Coalition appeared to be the only viable electoral alternative to the Social Democrats and the Civic Democratic party.
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There were also delays in reaching agreement on the transfer of competences to the new regions. Immediately following the November 2000 elections, new laws entered into force giving regional governments powers in the areas of education (establishment and management of daycare centers, kindergartens, and primary and secondary schools), culture (establishment and management of theatres, museums, galleries, and zoos), regional development (coordination of the development of the region, approval of development programs, and oversight of planning and zoning documents), transportation (ownership and maintenance of second-class and third-class roads), environment (protection from deterioration, possibility to influence the location and quality of utility facilities, and management of protected areas and parks), and health and social care (establishment and management of hospitals, nursing homes, and facilities for physically and mentally disabled adults and children). Additional responsibilities include cooperation with other regions within the country as well as abroad. An important prerogative of regional councils is their right to submit bills to the Chamber of Deputies of the national Parliament and proposals to the Constitutional Court for the repeal of legislation believed to contradict the law. Regional governments must not encroach on the rights of municipalities and are not superordinate to them.
Debate continued over the precise delineation of competences between national, regional, and municipal authorities, although greater clarification was achieved with new legislation in 2002 and the abolition of district offices and the transfer of their competences to regional and municipal authorities in January 2003. 29 Even several years after their inception, the regions still face difficulties when attempting to fully take up their role as key actors in the Czech political system. The continued reluctance of the national government to transfer the competences and corresponding financial instruments to the regions has significantly limited the capabilities of the regions to finance major regional-development projects. These limitations led the regions to narrow their operational focus to low-cost, non-investment activities, including strategic planning and partnership-building. The regions have also intensified theirjoint cooperation in order to put pressure on those natinal ministries still withholding their competences. This pressure has in some instances even taken the form of legal actions against the central-state bodies. Some regions have filed constitutional complaints with the Czech High Court to win competences in the areas of education (i.e., primary and secondary schools) and health care (i.e., hospitals). Disagreement also persisted on financing arrangements for the new regions, with the Commission expressing considerable concern about this issue in its 2001 progress report. 30 In its 2002 report, however, the Commission noted substantial progress in this area, with regional governments having been granted a fixed share of tax revenues and the abolition of limits on their ability to run debts, thus giving them increased financial and decision-making autonomy. However, the Commission noted that some questions remained regarding the financial capacity of regional governments to exercise their new competences.
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THE 2000 REGIONAL ELECTIONS
The creation of regional governments introduced an important new level of politics in the Czech Republic. How would regional politics affect and be affected by national politics, and what would be its impact on the Czech party system? We will not know the answers to these questions for quite some time, but some initial indications were provided by the inaugural regional elections in November 2000, which were followed by national parliamentary elections in June 2002.
The emergence of the Four-Party Coalition and public concerns about the "opposition treaty" between the Social Democrats and the Civic Democratic party set the stage for the elections of 12 November 2000. The regional elections coincided with the election of one-third of the Senate. Using a proportional election system, 675 deputies were elected for 13 regional assemblies. 32 The fourteenth region of Prague elected its regional legislature in November 2002 because the region was temporarily under a different electoral act in 2000.
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Turnout for the regional elections in November 2000 was low. Turnout ranged from a high of 36.5 percent in the Pardubicky region to a low of 28.4 percent in the Karlovarsky region. Turnout for all the regions averaged 33.6 percent. 34 When the election for the regional assembly in Prague waŝ finally held in November 2002, the level of voter turnout (35.3 percent) was roughly in line with the other regional elections. 35 Turnout levels in the regional elections were positively associated with the percentage of residents age 60 and older, but voter participation was negatively related to the unemployment rate and level of urbanization.* 6 Before turning to an examination of party support, several hypotheses can be articulated to guide the analysis. First, the Civic Democratic party should do well in prosperous regions based upon its support for free-market principles. Second, the Social Democratic party and the Communist party should excel in economically distressed regions because of their calls for more expansive social-welfare programs. Third, the percentage of the vote for the Communist party should increase as the percentage of the population age 60 and older rises in a region. Elderly voters may be more likely to look upon the Communist era with a sense of nostalgia. Finally, the Four-Party Coalition, anchored by the Christian Democratic party and its strong base of support in southern Moravia, should receive high levels of support in rural regions of the Czech Republic.
Levels of party support by region are summarized in Table 1 . The Civic Democratic party won the most votes in a majority of the regions holding elections in 2000: Stredocesky, Jihocesky, Plzensky, Karlovarsky, Liberecky, Kralovehradecky, and Moravskoslezsky. Civic Democratic party candidates won 185 seats in the November 2000 regional elections.
37 The Four-Party Coalition won the most votes in five regions: Pardubicky, Vysocina, Jihomoravsky, Olomoucky, and Zlinsky. Four-Party Coalition candidates (i.e., Christian Democrats, the Union of Freedom, the Civic Democratic Alliance, and the Democratic Union) won 171 seats across the 13 regional assemblies. 38 The Communist party won the most votes in the Ustecky region of northern Bohemia. The Communist party recorded remarkable success with the election of 161 deputies.
39 Table 1 reveals that the Communist party received a larger percentage of the vote than the Social Democrats in all 13 regions holding elections in November 2000. The percentage of the vote for the Social Democrats ranged from a low of 11.47 percent in the Vysocina region to a high of 17.24 percent in the Ustecky region. The election of only 111 deputies representing the Social Democratic party was a big disappointment for the ruling party. 40 Finally, Table 1 Pearson's r = .703 between voter turnout and percentage of the population age 60 and over (statistically significant at p<.01). The correlation between voter turnout and the unemployment rate was -.466. Urbanization (percentage of the population living in cities) had a modest correlation of-.40 with voter turnout.
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Independents did particularly well in three regions: Plzensky, Olomoucky, and Liberecky. This success can be attributed to several well-known candidates seeking elected office as Independents in the aforementioned regions. Independents and small parties won a total of 47 seats in the November 2000 regional elections. 41 A total of 41 parties competed in the regional elections, although many ran in just one region. The November 2000 elections were hardly a referendum on party support for the creation of regional assemblies. Despite the initial opposition and foot dragging of the Civic Democratic party to the creation of regional governments, the party's candidates were not punished by the electorate in the first regional assembly elections. The Four-Party Coalition, which enthusiastically supported the creation of regional governments, also did very well in the elections. Finally, the Communist party with its reservations about creating regional governments surprised many observers with a strong showing in the regional elections. Table 2 reports the correlations between several socio-economic characteristics and the percentage of the vote for each political party by region. 44 Four variables are positively associated with electoral support for the Civic Democratic party: urbanization, per capita income, population density, and percentage of the workforce employed in services. Support for the Civic Democratic party is negatively associated with percentage of the workforce employed in agriculture and forestry. As hypothesized, the Civic Democratic party received higher levels of support in wealthier and more urbanized regions. Given the powerful base of support for the Civic Democratic party in Prague, none of these findings are surprising. As expected, the Social Democrats and Communists did very well in regions with a high level of unemployment. The Communist party also did well in less densely populated regions. In contrast to the original hypothesis, the percentage of the vote for the Communist party declined as the percentage of the population age 60 and older increased in a region. The correlation coefficient is not only in an unexpected direction but it is also statistically significant. Several factors might account for this finding. Prague has the highest proportion of the population age 60 and older (21 percent) but it also has the lowest unemployment rate (4.2 percent) of any region. Moravskoslezsky has the lowest proportion of the population age 60 and older (16 percent) but one of the highest unemployment rates (14percent) of any region. The Communist party received its second highest level of support in the Moravskoslezsky region and its lowest level of support in Prague. It may be that economics trumps age. Furthermore, data in this study is aggregated by region. Surveys of individuals such as exit polls would provide a more accurate description of the link between age and voting behavior. Finally, itjust might be that individuals who lived most of their life under communism are unwilling to support the party in contemporary elections.
DISCUSSION
Voter turnout in the regional elections (33.6 percent) was very low, especially in comparison to previous elections. Turnout was twice as high in elections for the lower house of Parliament, the Chamber of Deputies, in 1996 (76.4 percent) and 1998 (72.7 percent) . Municipal elections also witnessed higher turnout rates of 60.7 percent in 1994 and 45 percent in 1998. 45 The skepticism of certain political parties such as the Civic Democratic party about the creation of regional assemblies as well as voter confusion about the purpose and functions of the new regions may have contributed to the low turnout rate in the inaugural regional elections. General voter distrust in the political process might be the key culprit. Low turnout in the regional elections does not appear to be an anomaly. Elections for the Chamber of Deputies in June 2002 generated a turnout of 58 percent, which was the lowest level for a parliamentary election since 1989. 46 More than half of the electorate (53 percent) in the Czech Republic is distrustful of political parties, and another 25 percent is skeptical. Although the Social Democrats failed to win a plurality in any of the regional elections, the party won the largest share of the vote (30.2 percent) in the 2002 parliamentary elections. 48 The party's comeback can be attributed to privatizing the three largest banks in the country, getting the nation back on track for EU accession, and restoring the economy to a moderate rate of growth by attracting the largest amount of direct foreign investment of any country in Central and Eastern Europe. 49 Furthermore, the election of Vladimir Spidla as the chairman of the party in the spring of 2001 helped to restore the credibility of the party. Undeniably, external pressure from the European Union played a major role in the creation of regional assemblies in the Czech Republic, but it is 52 Kraus, "The Czech Republic's First Decade," 50.
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equally critical to understand the role of domestic politics, particularly the jockeying among the various political parties. The large number of regions and the failure to draw their boundaries along historical lines reflect a clear attempt to limit the power and influence of the new regional governments. Throughout the 1990s, Klaus' Civic Democratic party (ODS) viewed the creation of regional assemblies as a threat to administrative control from the center and a challenge to the power of ODS. The Czech Social Democratic party and Civic Democratic party attempted to use the electoral law on the regional assemblies as a vehicle to establish a two-party system. The Four-Party Coalition emerged as a counter response to this initiative. Despite their success in the regional elections, the Four-Party Coalition was unable to remain united. Given the shifting party coalitions, strong presence of the Communist party, lack of a dominant party, and voter distrust of the political parties, it may be many years until regional elections serve as a useful guide for party success in parliamentary elections. For scholars of intergovernmental relations, regional governments in the Czech Republic will continue to serve as a valuable unit of analysis for future studies. Now that the Czech Republic is a full-fledged member of the European Union, regional governments will play a key role in the administration of EU Structural Funds. The funds are designed to redress regional disparities in wealth. The task is particularly daunting in the Czech Republic. Only the Prague region can boast of a per capita GDP that exceeds the EU average. For the remaining regions, per capita GDP ranges from 50 to 64 percent of the EU average. 59 Furthermore, the regional assemblies will continue to grapple with new powers in the areas of education, regional development, transportation, environment, and health care. Finally, future regional elections provide an opportunity to examine shifting party coalitions, party platforms, and campaign strategies.
